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NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
Howard P. Kainz

First, I want to discuss some terms. ''Natural rights" and "human rights" are closely
related but not synonyms. Natural rights are connected with natural law theory and
encompass human rights. If something is considered a natural right, it is also a
human right. Not every proponent of human rights subscribes to natural law theory,
however. From this perspective, it is false to say that ifsomething is a human right,
it is also a natural right. Although we expect a broad convergence of rights agreed
on from both perspectives, divergences may occur.
Also, "natural rights" should be distinguished from "~atural · law." The /
confusions between thein are traditional and long-standing. Ius~n Latin can mean
either "right" or "law." This ambiguity led the medieval jurists to make a
distinction between objective ius and subjective ius (law and right). 1 Perhaps the
sam~ ambiguity helped transform the historical emphasis from law to rights,
without the change being noticeable. In German, das Recht has a similar double
meaning, leading to hesitation among translators as to whether Hegel's Philosophie
des Rechts should be translated as Philosophy ofRight or Philosophy ofLaw. The
case is similar to le droit in French, el derecho in Spanish, and lo diritto in Italian.
So we are faced with adeast one situation where Anglophones might claim that
their language is more precise philosophically than other languages!
But the ambiguities are not just semantic, they are also conceptual. Many
philosophers associate "natural law" with "state of_nature" theories, which are
primarily concerned ·with the elucidation .of basic rights. However, we should
.remember that even classical theorists like Hobbes and Locke discuss natural law
as well as natural right.
. Natural law addresses fundamental moral duties, natural right (and rights)
concern fundamental moral claims or entitlements. John Finnis in Natural Law and
Natural Rights develops a precise legal definition:
We may safely speak of rights wherever a basic principle or requirement of
practical reasonableness, or a rule derived therefrom, gives to A, and to each
and every other member of a class to which A belongs, the benefit of (i) a
positive or negative requirement (obligation) imposed upon B (including, inter
alia, any requirement not to interfere with A's activity or with A's enjoyment
of some other form of good) or of (ii) the ability to bring it about that B is
subject to such a requirement, or of (iii) the immunity from being himself
subjected by B to any such requirement. 2 .
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~· Natural law and natural right are correlative; neither can exist without the other.
In social relationships, the existence of a right implies a corresponding duty, and
a strict duty in a social context implies that someone has a right. In philosophy,
natural rights are connected with individuality and personhood. Natural law,
however, is associated with sociality and communality - the proper relationship
· between individuals, possibly in a top-down configuration, sometimes horizontally.
Natural rights are implicit in a natural law theory, but explicit attention to
natural rights has evolved slowly. One hears of dubious and strained ascriptions of
natural rights theory to Plato and Aristotle, but we should focus on the Stoics for
definite statements about natural rights. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus writes, j
"Even the slave is deserving our esteem and able to claim from us his rights"3 - a
far-reaching insight coming froin the second century A.D. Aquinas, however, does
not present a theory of rights in the modem sense. !us for Aquinas is Aristotelian ./
justice, the virtuous maintenance of equitable relationships concerning property ·
among individuals. He says nothing about the right to political liberty or equality,
or even to life or happiness.
The modem notion of natural/human rights came into the limelight with the
French Declaration ofthe Rights ofMan and the Citizen (1789), which asserted
that liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression were the "imprescrip
tible natural rights" of all human beings. They are "imprescriptible" because no
political power or legislature could grant them or take them away. Earlier,
American founders like Jefferson, working in the context of Lockean natural law
theory, grappled with the problem of coordinating natural law with the rights of
subjectivity. Spelling out these rights, the American Declaration ofIndependence
(1776), thirteen years before the French Declaration, opens by emphasizing the
basic rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
~
For us in the twenty-first century, the major impetus to a revival of interest in
both natural law and natural rights was the Nuremberg trials in the aftermath of
World War Il and the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. These trials brought to the fore
·the question ofwhether there is any ~gher law to which we can.appeal when statist
laws are corrupt or evil. (How can we even judge statist laws as evil, except in
· terms of some higher standard oflaw?) Subsequently, a remarkable international
consensus on basic human rights was achieved in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, promulgated by the United Nations, which gave member nations
the hope ofpreventing any recurrence of a holocaust. The rights listed in the 1948
Declaration included rights to life, liberty, and security of person; equality before
the law; privacy; marriage and protection offamily life; the ownership ofproperty;
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; work; education; protection against
unemployment; enjoyment of the arts; and many other rights in the legal, political,
and cultural spheres.
As we examine this extremely extensive list, the question naturally emerges as
to whether consensus, even broad consensus, is enough to provide a justification.
for these rights. If someone asks, "What are the grounds for the supposed right to
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freedom of thought?" we should be able to offer a satisfactory philosophical
grounding for this .alleged right. And do not some rights exist, say, the rights of
women and children, which, even in lieu of a broad consensus, can be and should
be justified and defended?
Wh.e n asked about the foundation of natural rights, our first response might be,
"Well, of course, the basis for natural rights must be in human nature itself." But
this respon$e will soon encounter the objection, "What do you mean by human
nature?" Even if you could answer that objection satisfactorily, you would
inevitably encounter the next objection, "You are guilty of the value/fact or
'ought'/'is' fallacy." Natural rights are obviously values, and we cannot derive a
value from a fact; but is not human nature something factual? The interdiction of
this fallacy is supposedly traceable to Hume, although a number of works take
issue with this widespread interpretation ofHume.4 But if, in our strenuous efforts
to avoid all fallacies, we resolutely try to avoid deriving any moral values from
human nature, we almost inevitably end up trying to excogitate basic values on the
basis of pure reason, something that Hume, who traced moral values back to ·
"sentiments" grounded in human nature, roundly criticized.
Hume writes:
The Ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for
by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections
of mankind without any dependence .on the intellectual faculties ... Reason,
being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse
received from appetite or inclination by showing us the means of attaining
happiness or avoiding misery ... The standard of[reason], being founded on the
nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme
Being; the standard of [the sentiments], arising from the internal frame and
constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that Supreme Will which
bestowed on each being its peculiar nature and arranged the several class~s and
orders of existence.s
The major contemporary theoretician of natural law and natural rights John Finnis,
following the lead of the Thomist Germain Grisez, makes a clean break with
Thomistic attempts - or what seem like Thomistic attempts - to derive natural law
from human nature. His non-derivation is based on set of seven self-evident basic
values- knowledge, life (preservation oflife, possibly also the procreation oflife),
play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness
(applying one's intelligence to problems and situations), and religion and pursuit
ofultimate questions about the cosmos and life- analyzed in the light of"practical
reasonableness.''6 Ironically, Finnis, whose main purpose is to develop a natural
law theory adhering strictly to Humean requirements, ends up ignoring the "natural
sentiments" that Hume emphasized and relying on the sort ofpure rational analysis
that Hume criticized. Finnis's analytical "baptism" ofAquinas's arguments has led
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to an ongoing dispute between traditional Thomists like Henry Veatch and Ralph
Mcinerny. 7 More recently, Anthony Lisska tried to mediate between the two camps
by discerning analogues to human nature in the concept of "natural kinds," often
used in contemporary analytic philosophy. 8
Natural rights that are not based on nature would be equivocal. Finnis indicated
this in a fall 1997 colloquium in the Marquette University Law School. When
asked who would be excluded as a natural law ethicist, he was unwilling to ·exclude
any person who held a non-relativistic ethical theory. On further questioning, he
included both Bentham and Kant as "natural law theorists"! He then admitted that
only on the urging of his mentor, H.L.A. Hart, did he title his book Natural Law
and Natural Rights. He refused to answer questions·about his preferred title for the
book. We may surmise that Finnis, Grisez, and others share the search for
objective, non-relativistic ethical principles with traditional natural law theorists.
A key problem for some natural law theorists is .the Summa theologiae,
1-11.94.2, where Aquinas seems to derive natural laws from the tripartite aspects
of human nature. He writes:
The order of the precepts of the natural law exists according to the order of
natural inclinations. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good
in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances:
inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according
to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural
law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more
specially. According to that nature which he has in common with other anim~ls:
and in virtue of this inclination. those things are said to belong to the natural
law, which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual ·intercourse,
education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to
good, according to the n~ture ofhis reason, which nature is proper to him: thus
man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in
society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the
natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among
whom one has to live. and other such things regarding the above inclination.9
Thus, Aquinas makes the distinction between three aspects of "nature" in human
beings and the fundamental inclinations consequent upon each aspect. First, he
argues that humans.are beings and, like all natural beings, are inclined to preserve
themselves, to stay in being. Second, he says they are animals inclined to reproduce
and rear their young. Third, their essence is distinctively and uniquely rational, so
that they are naturally inclined to knowledge and social order. From these premises,
Aquinas derives the fundamental natural laws of self-preservation, sexual
responsibility and the duty to educate the young, and the duties to strive. for
knowledge of God and maintain amicable relationships with fellow human beings.
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Finnjs characterizes·these passages as simply a "meditation" on the relationship of
.human life to three metaphysical levels - inorganic, organic, and mental. 1 Finnis
argues that thjs could not be a deduction of values, since values must be derived
independently of facts, on the basis of their intrinsic self-evidence.
I am suspicious that Finnis spends fourteen pages in Natural Law and Natural
Rights arguing for the "self-evidence" of knowledge, the first of the seven· "basic
values," and twelve pages discussing the other six values. His long drawn-out and
multifaceted arguments for the value ofknowledge are offered as a template for the
rules of self-evidence, which can be applied to the other values. But after reading
these arguments, we think ofthe scholastic distinction between things that are self
evident in se and things that are self-evident quoad nos. Surely the moral value of
the third basic value, "play," is something that for trained philosophers is not self
evident quoad nos, but at most self-evident in se.
I suggest we take a second look at Aquinas's triple division discussed above.
On closer examination of the controversial Question 94 ofthe Summa, we may find
Aquinas's analysis is not really guilty ofderiving values from facts, and is not only
the clearest exposition of basic natural "laws," but also of basic natural "rights."
First it may be a little difficult to understand how an inclination to "self
pres~rvation" can be predicated for beings that have no "self." Also, the
Aristotelian theory that natural "appetites" are intrinsic to all beings - · stic_ks and
stones, as well as plants and animals - may seem overly anthropomorphic.
However, leaving some unstable elements ofphysics aside, we can generalize that
natural kinds tend to stay in existence. It is almost self-evident that living beings,
with all their built-in mechanisms for preserving themselves, tend to stay in being,
even if we are anxious to avoid Aristotelian presuppositions about teleology. Thls
tendency toward self-preservation is both a factµal drive and a value. Natural
beings are constituted to preserve themselves, and this is intrinsically good and
valuable. Regarding the second natural ~spect, sexuality, we may experience
_culture-shock, living in an era full of symbols of a contraceptive mentality.
However, even the contraceptive mentality underlines our acute awareness of the
connection between sexuality and reproduction and our understanding that rearing
human children is much more arduous and time-consuming than rearing animal
offspring. The birth of a human being does not just take place nine months after
conception, but involves prolonged gestation by the family and the community, and
immense amounts of education to supply for the comparative lack of instincts in
humans. Again, we are faced with the drive to raise our offspring and the
responsibility, spanning many years after birth, to further the material, intellectual,
and spiritual.welfare of our children. With the third natural aspect, rationality, we
might balk at Aquinas's extrapolation of rationality to the quest for knowledge of
God, but we can have no doubt that the human desire for knowledge has no built-in
limits. Aquinas also associates rationality with sociality. This tendency of dealing
rationally with fellow human beings might be ~haracterized as the basis for the jus
naturale, but the "facts" connected with rationality are not "just" facts. They

°
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converge with the values of expanding knowledge and increasing communality._
The convergence is so close and clear in this· case that discussion of the
"derivation" of the values from the facts misses the point, as if some neutral hiatus
exists between facts and values.
Second, in common parlance, we hear about the "law of self-preservation," so
existence of such a "law" is a truism. But the self-preservation of the individual is
both a duty and a right, the right to life. Self-preservation implies, for example, the
duty and right to maintain health and security, the duty and right to avoid
euthanasia and assisted suicide; some people even speak of a duty and a right
toward things like the primary or secondary inhalation of cigarette smoke. The
dutiful implications of sexual reproduction are for us more problematic than the
duties of self-preservation. As the global population reaches six billion, some
people speak conversely about a solemn duty "not" to reproduce. If we examin_e
this position more closely, we find the real concern is that "poor" people stop
reproducing. They cannot assure us that if poor people have fewer children, the
ratio of poor people to rich people in the world will change for the better. We ask
ourselves if the biblical injunction to "increase and multiply, and fill the earth"
(Genesis I :28) has any meaning at this time. Have we not filled the earth? Not
really. The world has plenty of room for everyone. One political scientist has
calculated that if the population ofthe world lived in Texas, there would be a little
over 1,300 square feet for each individual. If an "over-population" problem exists,
it is not because of too little space. What we call "overpopulation" has to do with
politics and the problems of distributing the world's resources. The natural "right"
of the poor and the rich to reproduce must be recognized, with the understanding
that the duty ofhaving offspring is limited, and, as Aquinas observed in regard to.
the status of celibates, it is not a duty for everyone. However, we should not
concentrate solely on the physical procreation of human beings, for whoin the
"gestation period" goes well beyond nine months. Corollary with reproductive
rights and duties are the right and the duty of working for a living wage to support
our offspring. The most important rights and duties are to hurture and educate
them, once we bring them into the world, a task many parents are unwilling to
·entrust completely to the state or to a third party. Finally, in the third natural aspect,
we see the clearest convergence of right and duty. Oui development of rational
capacities and the pursuit of knowledge and social concord are not only inalienable
rights that we must constantly defend, but they are irrevocable duties that cannot
be shirked without a loss of our humanity.
·
You will note that many of the rights listed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights - the rights to life, security of person, marriage and protection.of
family life, the ownership of property, work, education, protection against
unemployment - are connected with the rights we have just discussed. But what
about freedom? The Universal Declaration also mentions' 'liberty, freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion. For the modem consciousness, these rights have
a certain precedence and preeminence. Is there such a thing as a natural law or a
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natural right ofpursuing freedom? We should be aware that freedom in the modem
sense does not appear in ancient and medieval philosophy. Explicit discussion of
freedom in our sense is not found in the writings of classical natural law theorists.
Yet freedom and the right to freedom is implicit in Aquinas. While he does not
explicitly mention an inclination to freedom, in the Thomistic Aristotelian context,
where the will is the "appetite" of the rational/intellectual faculty, an impetus
toward freedom is implied. If the development of rationality is a right and a duty,
then the acknowledgment and exercise of freedom is indispensable to rational
living. This falls short of Jean-Paul Sartre's attempt to base all values on freedom
and ofthe emphasis on freedom iri the Western world and in modernity in general.
Here the · issue of the hierarchy of values becomes relevant. Reflection on the
Thomistic hierarchy, which begins with the law/right of self-preservation, may be
particularly timely for us. In ·our era of nuclear armament, as warheads are
multiplied, as great nations like India and Pakistan force their way into the "nuclear
club," and as potentially terrorist groups are enthusiastically acquiring "backpack"
and ''suitcase" atomic bombs, we could argue the "law of self-preservation" has ·
become the chief and the most relevant natural law. The world now is faced with
the pressing obligation ofeither eliminating its nuclear arsenals or facing imminent
destrµction from an accidental or intentional triggering of World War III. But this
obligation of self-preservation is at the same time a right that must be claimed by
the citizens of the world, despite government reluctance to change the "status quo"
of"Mutually Assured Destruction." If a hierarchy of values exists, life and survival
may be even more important than freedom, since they are the sine qua non for the
existence of freedom. John Finnis's mentor, the legal positivist, H.L.A. Hart,
although no proponent of natural law, suggested that survival is "the central
indisputable element which gives empirical good sense to the terminology of
Natural Law." 11 This is an interesting convergence of legal positivism and natural
law theory.
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